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more closely the interface between ‘sensory’ and
‘motor’ processing.
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Broadly speaking, we know what the brain does: it
converts spatio-temporal patterns of activity in sensory
receptors into patterns of motor activity in muscle fibres.
And broadly speaking we know how it does it: the recep-
tor patterns are mapped on to patterns in second-order
neurons, which in turn create new patterns in third-order
ones, and so on until finally we reach the motor neurons
that send commands to muscles. For complex actions
involving the cerebral cortex there may be many such
stages, often with recurrent pathways and back-propaga-
tion of information.
A system of this kind that we happen to know quite a lot
about is the one controlling saccades, the movements we
make in looking from one object to another. In the brain-
stem (Fig. 1), we can identify the neurons responsible for
creating the precise patterns of command needed to throw
the eye from one target to another, receiving instructions
from semi-automatic circuits in the superior colliculus that
can translate visual target position into suitable com-
mands, while the higher cortical processes have the job of
deciding which of all the potential targets that make up a
visual scene is actually interesting enough to be worth
looking at, something the colliculus is incapable of.
Conventionally, the left-hand side of Figure 1 would be
called ‘sensory’ and the right-hand side ‘motor’. But what
about the bits in the middle? Is there some line of demar-
cation, some frontier-post, at which we step from sensory
to motor?  Or is this a misguided question? In terms of the
gradual transformation of sensory patterns to motor ones
as they pass from one neural layer to the next within the
brain, can it possibly make sense to draw some artificial
boundary where stimulus becomes response?
Two arguments suggest it can. The first, only applicable
to us humans, is that a region where electrical stimulation
causes a conscious sensation can reasonably be called
‘sensory’, and one where movement is generated, without
a sense of having willed it, ‘motor’. For some areas at least,
the results of such experiments are unequivocal.  Stimula-
tion of the visual cortex in conscious subjects [1] causes
illusory visual perceptions called phosphenes; though the
subject may well make eye movements in consequence,
they are recognized as being ‘willed’. Conversely, stimula-
tion of motor cortex evokes movements that subjects typi-
cally say they were made to do, against their will [2]. But
Figure 1
The main pathways by which visual stimuli are
transformed into saccadic eye movements.
For clarity, inter-cortical pathways through
thalamic nuclei have been omitted. Cortical
areas are shaded. LGN, lateral geniculate
nucleus; V1–V5, VOT, IT and MT, cortical
visual areas; LIP, lateral intraparietal cortex;
FEF and SEF: frontal and supplementary
cortical eye fields; SNPR, substantia nigra
pars reticulata.
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experiments of this kind can necessarily be performed
only rarely, and although in principle they could be carried
out for some of the more central cortical areas in the
middle of Figure 1, this has not yet been done.
There is, however, a second, less direct, way of distin-
guishing experimentally between sensory and motor
systems, which can be used in animals. A feature of the
brain — indeed its main purpose — is that specific
responses are not exclusive to specific stimuli; on the con-
trary, one may learn to make virtually any response to any
stimulus. Clearly, it would not make sense for the neural
mechanisms of sensory processing — the detection, local-
ization and recognition of a visual object, for example —
to be duplicated for every possible response that might be
evoked. Equally, it would be absurd to have different
motor circuits for reaching out to pick up a tin of soup
rather than a tin of beans, simply because the stimuli are
different. There is thus a kind of natural culmination of
sensory processing at the point where an object has been
recognized and its position identified; and it is natural to
think of this as linked by some sort of cerebral telephone
switchboard to fragments of motor repertoire. In other
words, as we move from sensory input to motor output, we
would expect to find a stage at which the response to a
stimulus suddenly depends on the task about to be per-
formed, whereas previously it depended solely on the
stimulus itself.
This, in essence, is the approach adopted by Snyder et al.
[3] in a recent study on neurons in the posterior parietal
cortex of monkeys. The lateral intraparietal area (LIP;
see Fig. 1) contains many cells that are active either
when a saccade is about to be made to a visual target pre-
viously displayed at a particular location, or before an arm
movement reaching out to it. Although these cells are
ultimately driven by vision, unlike neurons further up-
stream in visual cortex they fire strongly in response to
remembered targets as well as ones actually present. This
kind of behaviour can be demonstrated in a ‘delayed
response’ task (Fig. 2). The monkey fixates a central
target, while a peripheral cue is briefly flashed up; but he
has been trained not to respond immediately to the
peripheral target, but only when permission is given by
extinguishing the fixation spot. In addition, the colour of
the flashed target tells the monkey whether an eye or
arm movement is required: red for a saccade, and green
for a reach. Of the neurons examined in this way, the sus-
tained activity during the delay was specific for either
arm or eye movement in some two-thirds of the recorded
cells, the remaining one-third firing for both responses.
One might well think that the tonic firing of these cells
during the waiting period in itself shows that they are part
of the motor, rather than the sensory, system, in the sense
of coding for the task that is about to be performed. But
this is not so, for one could regard this activity as merely
reflecting the fact that the monkey’s attention is focused
on the location, even though the target is no longer visible.
In neighbouring areas of parietal cortex, neurons often
continue to fire in delayed tasks even when no subse-
quent movement is made [4], so long as the monkey is
attending to the location.
There is, however, a simple way of demonstrating that
these cells really are task-dependent, rather than merely
attentional, which is to train the monkeys to perform a
dissociational task. Here, red and green targets are pre-
sented simultaneously on opposite sides, requiring a reach
in one direction at the same time as an eye movement in
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Figure 2
Activity of neurons in monkey parietal cortex
during ‘saccade’ and ‘reach’ trials, as
described in the text. The lowest part of each
panel shows the action potential density
recorded during eight trials, and the histogram
above shows their averaged activity. Each cell
fires initially in response to either cue;
thereafter, sustained firing occurs only before
its own preferred task — saccade or reach —
and not the other. (Adapted from [3].)
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the other. This procedure also gets round the problem
that, in ‘arm’ tasks, an eye movement is often executed at
the end of the reach as well, so that some neurons may
show activity indiscriminately during either task, even
though they are really coding only for eye movement.
This was indeed what Snyder et al. [3] found, the total
percentage of genuinely task-specific cells rising as a
result of using the dissociation task from 68% to 84%.
Thus the evidence that neurons in these regions are task-
specific and not merely attention-dependent, motor rather
than sensory, seems pretty clear.
A rather different approach to defining the sensorimotor
boundary is exemplified by another recent paper, by
Thompson et al. [5]. Again, eye movements of monkeys
were measured during a visual task in conjunction with
electrical recording, this time from neurons in the frontal
eye fields (FEF; see Fig. 1). The neurons chosen for
recording were in some ways similar to the ones in LIP
described earlier: they respond to visual stimuli and con-
tinue firing until a subsequent saccade is made to the
target. A trial started with the monkey fixating a central
spot, which was suddenly extinguished and replaced with
a ring of eight separate stimuli, one of the eight (the
target) differing in appearance from the others, perhaps
being red while the distractors were green: the monkeys’
task was simply to make a saccade to look at the target.
Meanwhile, the experimenters recorded the electrical
activity of a neuron whose receptive field covered one of
the eight stimuli; thus, on some trials this neuron would
‘see’ the target, and on others a distractor. As had been
reported earlier [6,7], the initial response to stimulus onset
is essentially identical whether the neuron sees a target or
a distractor. But over a period of some 200 milliseconds the
activity shows a kind of evolution: if a distractor is present,
the firing frequency gradually drops, but in the case of a
target it is maintained until eventually a saccade is made.
It is not until the two types of response finally part
company that the cell can be said to ‘know’ which kind of
stimulus — target or distractor — is actually present, and
therefore whether or not a response is required.
The activity of these cells seems to reflect some kind of
discriminatory decision process. But do they actually
trigger the motor response? The answer is complicated by
the inevitable existence of noise — random fluctuations of
activity from trial to trial. If a very large number of
responses in individual trials is plotted (Fig. 3), it is clear
that we need to think in terms of two stochastic popula-
tions of responses — one for the target and one for a dis-
tractor. These populations are at first statistically indis-
tinguishable, but after some 100 milliseconds they begin
to diverge, until by 150 milliseconds they barely overlap at
all. Somewhere in between — actually around 120 milli-
seconds — the divergence reaches statistical significance,
in the sense that the cell can reliably indicate whether a
distractor or a target is present. 
Now, saccadic reaction times are indeed extremely
variable: for a person whose mean latency is 200 millisec-
onds, one may well find that 5% of responses are shorter
than 150 or longer than 250 milliseconds, and the range for
the monkeys is similar. But by comparing sets of trials
with long reaction times with those with short reaction
times, it turns out that the variation in the time these cells
take to discriminate between their stimuli is far smaller
than that of latency as a whole. The conclusion must be
that what dominates the variability of reaction time is not
the initial stage of sensory discrimination, but a second
process more in the nature of selecting and preparing for
the eventual motor response. 
Figure 3
Neurons in the FEF discriminating between
targets and distractors; see text for details.
Firing frequencies recorded during individual
trials with either a target (blue points) or
distractor (red) are plotted as a function of
time after presentation of the stimulus. At first,
the response is identical in both kinds of trial,
but after 100 milliseconds the profiles diverge,
with firing frequency dropping towards the
baseline when the stimulus is a distractor. By
some 120 milliseconds, the two populations
are statistically distinct from one another.
(Adapted from [5].)D
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In fact, experiments with remembered, rather than
immediate, targets reveal a population of cells in the
monkey FEF whose properties seem much more closely
to fit this second stage, and whose activity corresponds
more closely with the variation in behavioural response.
These are the visual movement cells, whose activity starts
long in advance of a saccade, rises steadily to a relatively
fixed threshold level, at which point a saccade is made,
and then declines rapidly back to baseline. In a recent
paper, Hanes and Schall [8] were able to show that the
variation in the rate of rise of activity of such cells from
trial to trial predicts closely the observed variation of sac-
cadic latency itself, corresponding very well with a previ-
ous quantitative model [9,10] of the statistical properties
of saccadic latency in human subjects.
It thus begins to look as if there are at least two popula-
tions of cells in the FEF, corresponding broadly to a
process of sensory discrimination on the one hand and of
motor decision making on the other. As the two popula-
tions are intermingled, we unfortunately cannot apply the
human test of whether stimulation generates movements
against the subject’s will, because of the inevitable spatial
spread of either electrical or transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion. A promising approach is to use countermanding
tasks, in which a movement is cued but almost immedi-
ately cancelled by means of a second stimulus; by compar-
ing the activity of both types of cell in those trials when
the movement is or is not made, it should be possible to
characterize still more exactly just how their activity may
relate to processes of perception and volition.
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